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Defining the Appellate Universe:
Does FRCP 52(b) Impose a Duty on Litigants?
Daniel R. Finet
INTRODUCTION: LIGHTNING BUGS, FERRETS, AND ISSUE Y
The difference between the almost right word and the right word
is... the difference between the lightning bug and the lightning.
-Mark Twain'
Judges are not ferrets.
-Linrud v Linrud2
The quotations above highlight a central tension in the law: care
and thoroughness versus preservation of resources.' One aspect of this
tension is revealed by a circuit split related to the Federal Rules, in par-
ticular the question of whether Rule 52(b) imposes a duty on litigants
to preserve an issue for appeal or risk waiving' it. Rule 52(b) provides
that "[o]n a party's motion ... after entry of judgment, the court may
amend its findings-or make additional findings-and may amend the
judgment accordingly."' The rule permits a party to file a motion for
findings after the judgment; whether it requires such a motion in order
to preserve certain issues for appeal is open to debate.
In creating a record adequate for purposes of appellate review,
both litigants and judges bear burdens. Litigants must, through their ac-
tions in the trial court, put the trial judge on notice that a given issue
needs to be addressed (thlus preserving tihel issJ. In tur ,5desn
t BA 2002, The College of William & Mary; JD 2008,The University of Chicago.
1 Mark Twain, Reply to the Editor of The Art of Authorship, in Tom Quirk, ed, Mark
Twain: Tales, Speeches, Essays, and Sketches 359,360 (Penguin 1994).
2 552 NW2d 342,345 (ND 1996).
3 See Scalea v Scalea's Airport Service, Inc, 833 F2d 500,502-03 (3d Cir 1987) (per curiam)
(remanding a case to the trial court where the lower court's opinion spoke only in generalities
about the claims raised by one party in a contract dispute); Colorado River Water Conservation
District v United States, 424 US 800, 817-21 (1976) (discussing judicial economy as a reason for
avoiding duplicative litigation in state and federal courts).
4 "Forfeiting" is the more accurate term. See United States v Charles, 476 F3d 492, 495 (7th
Cir 2007) ("Waiver requires intentional relinquishment of a known right, whereas forfeiture is
the result of an unintentional relinquishment of the right."). However, courts that discuss issue
preservation most often refer to waiver, and so does this Comment.
5 FRCP 52(b). The Rule is discussed in greater detail in Part I.C.
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jury trials must make factual findings and conclusions of law.6 Where
a judge fails to do this adequately-for example, if the court makes
conflicting factual findings, or if a trial court makes its findings in a
conclusory manner'- an appellate court may remand the case.
Now imagine the following scenario: a trial judge is faced with Issues
X, Y, and Z at trial. The judge is arguably required to make findings on
all these issues but fails to mention Issue Y in the court's opinion. Then
the appellant fails to alert the trial court to the omission using Rule 52(b).
Is the issue waived on appeal, or should the case be remanded for find-
ings on Issue Y? That question is the basis of a circuit split.
Answering the question requires resort both to the Federal Rules
and to an independent body of federal common law' that deals with
preserving issues for appeal and places burdens on litigants and judges."
Importantly, determining the mix of duties that a system imposes on
judges and litigants is a question distinct from determining the source of
authority for imposing the duties in the first place. Where courts have
held that a failure to file a Rule 52(b) motion waives an issue, they have
not made a convincing case that Rule 52(b) is such a source.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an over-
view of the relevant Federal Rules, as well as the common law back-
ground on preserving issues for appellate review. Part II analyzes the
holdings and rationales of the circuit courts' decisions related to
Rule 52(b). A common feature of these cases is that the courts provide
almost no legal analysis to support the positions they take. Part III
seeks to fill the analytical vacuum, relying primarily on traditional tools
of statutory interpretation to conclude that a reading of Rule 52(b) as
mandatory is unsound. Although defenders of a mandatory interpreta-
tion of Rule 52(b) may argue that their interpretation leads to a more
6 Under the Federal Rules, a judge in a nonjury trial "shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law... Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. "FRCP 52(a). The Rule applies to cases tried without a jury as well as cases tried with an
advisory jury. See id.
7 See Cerros v Steel Technologies, Inc, 398 F3d 944,949-50 (7th Cir 2005).
8 See Scalea, 833 F2d at 502-03.
9 See notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
10 While Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 78 (1938), held that there is no general
federal common law, this has not prevented judges from crafting "what Judge Friendly has
termed 'specialized federal common law' to govern a broad range of areas." Daniel J. Meltzer,
State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv L Rev 1128,1167 (1986).
11 The generally applicable common law rule is that a party may argue on appeal only those
issues raised at trial. See Yee v City of Escondido, 503 US 519,533 (1992). See also Robert J. Marti-
neau, Modem Appellate Practice: Federal and State Civil Appeals § 3.1 at 34 (Lawyers Cooperative
1983). At the same time, this is an area in which reviewing courts have discretion. See Singleton v
Wulff, 428 US 106,121 (1976).
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efficient allocation of resources, this is an empirical question the answer
to which is far from clear. Indeed, because of that "stalemate of empir-
ical intuitions,"'12 courts should be hesitant to call into doubt the inter-
pretation of Rule 52(b) reached using the traditional tools.
I. BACKGROUND: How COURTS (AND THE FEDERAL RULES)
REQUIRE PARTIES TO PRESERVE ISSUES WHILE
PROMOTING TRIAL COURT CARE
Courts use common law doctrines on issue preservation as well as
the Federal Rules to determine if an issue has been preserved for ap-
peal. Although the common law and the federal rules represent distinct
sources of authority, they are related: the philosophy of the common
law is "embodied in the Federal Rules."'3 Indeed, two aspects of the
common law doctrine on issue preservation are notably evident in the
rules: parties must play a role in preserving errors, and judges must be
thorough in their consideration of issues.
Common law practices on issue preservation have deep, historic
roots, antedating the Federal Rules by centuries. Given the history,
Part III argues that the drafters of Rule 52(b) most likely did not in-
tend an ambiguous provision to work a substantial change on com-
mon law practice-at least not without comment in the Advisory
Committee Notes.
A. Creating the Record and Waiving Issues at Common Law
Where parties at common law in England did not take affirma-
tive steps to ensure that an issue was part of the record, the issue was
wa Aveu, ttLr jUdgment was enteed in a case, an aggrieved , tart, couldfile a writ of error." When the writ was sent to the higher court," the
12 Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty 153-54 (Harvard 2006) (describing a "sta-
lemate of empirical intuitions" as occurring whenever the dispositive questions are empirical and
"no empirical answers are currently available").
13 See Pfeifer v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 678 F2d 453,457 n 1 (3d Cir 1982).
14 See W.S. Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law 215-18 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1922). The
writ of error was the precursor to the present day appeal, although it was not a true "appeal" in
the modem sense. See id at 213. Instead, the writ was a new action initiated against the trial
judge in a higher court. See Edson R. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 Iowa
L Rev 3,7 (1940).
15 See Richard H. Field, et al, Civil Procedure: Materials for a Basic Course 1437 (Founda-
tion 8th ed 2003). This court was, at least in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, almost al-
ways the King's Bench; courts that could review decisions of the King's Bench developed subse-
quently. See Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law at 222 (cited in note 14).
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record on review included only minimal information about the case."
To expand the record, a party could supplement the writ of error with
a bill of exceptions, which allowed a party to object to the "direction[s]
of the judge trying the cause" on legal issues or issues related to the
admission of evidence.'7 The bill of exceptions both required and per-
mitted parties to play a major role in creating the record for appeal."
Because the record itself contained so little information, if an error
occurred at trial and there were no bill of exceptions, then a host of
errors could not be reviewed.9
The common law rules were designed to promote care by trial
judges because a judgment could fall for any error.'° The requirement
in Rule 52(a) that judges make factual findings and legal conclusions
is analogous, although the modern rules are more forgiving to judges.'
Still, requiring parties to help create the record on appeal reflected
the "English instinct for judicial administration," which "has always
recognized that the trial ... [is] the primary field of court operation."''
That instinct crossed the Atlantic.
B. Creating the Record and Waiving Issues in American Courts
American courts inherited and preserved the practice of limiting
appellate review only to those issues that were raised at trial.3 Moreo-
ver, like the English courts, the Supreme Court recognized in McLish
v Roff " the desirability of resolving cases efficiently. In order to fulfill
this "object and policy" of the judicial system," the record on appeal
must be sufficiently developed to avoid unnecessary remands.2' Federal
16 Joseph H. Koffler and Alison Reppy, Common Law Pleading 599 (West 1969) (noting that
the record included the original writ and the Sheriffs return, pleadings, the verdict, and the judgment).
17 John William Smith, An Elementary View of the Proceedings in an Action at Law 163-64
(Adamant Media 2006).
18 See Field, Civil Procedure at 1437 (cited in note 15).
19 See Koffler and Reppy, Common Law Pleading at 599-600 (cited in note 16) (noting the
limited avenues for appellate review prior to 1285); J.W. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal
History 136-38 (Butterworths 4th ed 2002).
20 See Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law at 223 (cited in note 14).
21 See note 45 and accompanying text.
22 Sunderland, 26 Iowa L Rev at 4 (cited in note 14).
23 Id at 10. The English common law decisions involving writs of error are widely recognized
as having strongly influenced appellate practice in the United States. See, for example, Carleton M.
Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L J 539, 546 (1932). See also Judiciary Act
of 1789 § 25,1 Stat 85-86 (providing for appeal to the Supreme Court via writs of error).
24 141 US 661,665-66 (1891).
25 Id.
26 See Bailey v International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 175 F3d 526,530 (7th Cir 1999);
Telecommunications, Inc v CIR, 104 F3d 1229,1232 (10th Cir 1997).
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common law in America allocates much of the responsibility for de-
veloping the record to the parties-where a party fails to raise an ar-
gument effectively in the trial court, that argument is waived on ap-
peal.7 The modem common law rules do not put burdens on trial
court judges; rather, they tell appellate court judges whether a party
did enough to pursue an issue in the trial court such that the appellate
court can consider that issue or argument. That is, the common law
rules center on whether an appellate court can decide an issue, not
whether the trial court was required to do so.
In rationalizing the disposition of burdens, American courts today
go beyond the judicial economy argument advanced in McLish. One
rationale for imposing the burden on parties is that it results in superior
case outcomes." As the Supreme Court noted in Singleton v Wulff,9 par-
ties need to play a role in developing the record before judgment passes
on their claims" because this participation is more likely to produce the
"proper resolution" of the issues." Another idea relates to fairness-
permitting a party to litigate an issue at the appellate stage where the
opposing side did not have notice below robs the opponent of the op-
portunity to develop favorable facts and deploy persuasive arguments.
32
Although the general rules on issue preservation reflect the idea
that the trial is the primary forum in which parties should resolve dis-
putes, the application of the rules in a given case may depend on the
facts and the jurisdiction. As to the latter, the Court stated in Singleton
that determining when an issue has been preserved should be "left pri-
marily to the discretion of the courts of appeals."3 As to the former, the
case law shows that making a determination on whether an issue has
been preserved may be fact specific." For example, several courts have
stated that an argument that is merely hinted at and not addressed by the
trial court is not preserved for purposes of appeal.5 Even if a party's ar-
27 See Wisconsin v Mitchell, 508 US 476,482 n 2 (1993); Yee v Escondido, 503 US 519,533
(1992); Tele-Communication, Inc, 104 F3d at 1232-34 (delineating rationales for the general rule
and describing the rule's contours within the Tenth Circuit).
28 Bailey, 175 F3d at 529-30.
29 428 US 106 (1976).
30 See id at 120.
31 Id at 121.
32 See, for example, Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union, Local 134 v City of Atlanta,
920 F2d 800, 806 (11th Cir 1991). See also Singleton, 428 US at 120.
33 428 US at 121.
34 See Tele-Communications, nc, 104 F3d at 1233.
35 See Harrell v United States, 443 F3d 1231, 1233 (10th Cir 2006) (holding that vague ref-
erences to an issue are insufficient for preservation on appeal); Schneider v Local 103 IBEW
Health Plan, 442 F3d 1, 3 (1st Cir 2006) (holding that an issue raised in a perfunctory manner was
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gument is vague, however, an appellate court might conclude that the
issue has been preserved so long as the trial court addressed the argu-
ment.36 This conclusion may be more likely where the appeals court need
not remand the case or engage in additional factfinding to decide the
merits of the argument. 7 Indeed, deciding matters in these instances al-
lows appellate courts to resolve cases efficiently, sometimes sparing par-
ties the unnecessary expense and delay of additional legal proceedings.
C. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In addition to the common law rules on issue preservation, the
Federal Rules place burdens on litigants and judges. The basic concept
is that the federal rules allocate burdens to litigants (who make objec-
tions) and to judges (who make findings of fact and law). Rule 52(a)
requires judges in nonjury trials to make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. The rule serves at least two important purposes: it in-
forms appellate courts about the basis for the trial court's decision,
and it ensures reasoned decisionmaking by trial courts."' The next pa-
ragraph, Rule 52(b), lacks a clear interpretation. The Rule permits a
party to file a motion for findings after the judgment; two circuit
courts of appeals have held that, in order to preserve an issue, the rule
in some instances requires a party to file a 52(b) motion. 9
not preserved); New York Life Insurance Co v Brown, 84 F3d 137, 142 n 4 (5th Cir 1996) (stating
that when a party does not press an argument at trial but only "intimates" it, the issue is waived
for purposes of appellate review).
36 See Salge v Edna Independent School District, 411 F3d 178, 184 n 2 (5th Cir 2005).
37 See Bailey, 175 F3d at 530.
38 See TEC Engineering Corp v Budget Molders Supply, Inc, 82 F3d 542,545 (1st Cir 1996)
(discussing the importance of creating a record adequate for review); United States v Merz, 376
US 192, 199 (1964) (discussing the importance of reasoned decisionmaking). See also Charles
Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 9A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2571 at 219-22 (West
2008) (noting additional purposes courts have identified including "to make definite precisely
what is being decided by the case in order to apply the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata").
39 There is an additional rule on issue preservation that courts use, Rule 46, whose lan-
guage and structure are contrasted with Rule 52 in Part III.A. Rule 46 requires parties to object
to the actions of the trial court in order to preserve an issue for appeal. The Rule states:
A formal exception to a ruling or order is unnecessary. When the ruling or order is requested
or made, a party need only state the action that it wants the court to take or objects to, along
with the grounds for the request or objection. Failing to object does not prejudice a party who
had no opportunity to do so when the ruling or order was made.
FRCP 46. The plain language of the rule puts the burden on parties to preserve issues through
their real-time objections, letting the trial court know the party's preferred course. A party must
raise an objection pursuant to Rule 46 so as to "give the judge a fair chance to avoid error."
Kasper v Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital, 135 F3d 1170,1176 (7th Cir 1998).
Rule 46 applies to rulings such as the formulation of issues for trial, see Porterco, Inc v Igloo
Products Corp, 955 F2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir 1992), arguments made by opposing counsel, see Wal-
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1. Rule 52(a).
Rule 52(a) places certain burdens on judges. "[In all nonjury tri-
als], the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of
law separately."" Because requests for findings are not necessary for
purposes of review, the rule is "self-executing." That is, regardless of
what the parties do, judges are required to state their findings of fact
and conclusions of law.' These requirements, in turn, promote care by
the trial judge.42 "Often a strong impression that, on the basis of the
evidence, the facts are thus-and-so gives way when it comes to ex-
pressing that impression on paper." 3
By requiring judges to make factual findings and legal conclusions,
Rule 52(a) makes meaningful appellate review possible through issue
preservation." This parallels the English common law, although the
modern rule is considerably more forgiving." When a trial judge does
not sufficiently explain the basis for a ruling, the appellate court may
remand the case to the district court. Appellate courts may do this when
the lower court fails to address one of the arguments made by a party,'
when the court fails to make one or more factual findings that make up
a legal test, 7 or when the findings the court does provide are conclusory."
dorf v Shuta, 142 F3d 601,629 (3d Cir 1998), and the appropriateness of jury instructions, see Sucher
Packing Co v Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co, 245 F2d 513,519 (6th Cir 1957).
The importance of Rule 46 for purposes of this Comment consists of both what the rule does
substantively and how the rule's interpretation and language can be compared with Rules 52(a)
and 52(b). This idea is discussed in greater detail in Part III.A.
40 FRCP 52(a).
41 See Abatie v Alta Health and Life Insurance Co, 458 F3d 955, 973 (9th Cir 2006); Bergui-
do v Eastern Air Lines, Inc, 369 F2d 874, 877 (3d Cir 1966).
42 See United Siutes v Forness, 125 F2d 928,942 (2d Cir 1942).
43 Id. See also OCI Wyoming LP v PacifiCorp, 479 F3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir 2007) (stating
that remand is appropriate where "too little detail" requires the appellate court "to guess at why
the district court reached its conclusion").
44 See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v England, 454 F3d 290,304-05 (DC Cir 2006).
45 The Advisory Committee Notes make clear that the judge must make only "brief, defi-
nite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters" without overelaboration.
See FRCP 52(a), Advisory Committee Note to the 1946 Amendments.
46 See, for example, Supermercados Econo, Inc v Integrand Assurance Co, 375 F3d 1, 3-5
(1st Cir 2004) (remanding where a district court failed to make findings on one of the two claims
raised by the appellant); In re Fordu, 201 F3d 693, 710 (6th Cir 1999) (remanding a case where
the bankruptcy court dismissed without discussion two of a trustee's causes of action); Lipman v
Arlington Seating Co, 192 F2d 93, 96 (7th Cir 1951) (remanding a case where the district court
failed to address in its opinion a defense that was brought to the attention of the court during
oral argument).
47 See, for example, Natural Organics, Inc v Nutraceutical Corp, 426 F3d 576, 580 (2d Cir
2005). But see Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v Northlake Marketing and Supply, Inc, 45 F3d 1550,
1555-56 (Fed Cir 1995) (holding that a failure by the lower court to make findings on the obvious-
ness of a patent pursuant to factors announced by the Supreme Court did not warrant remand).
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2. Rule 52(b).
Rule 52(b) does not contain mandatory language similar to that
found in Rule 52(a). The Rule provides that "[o]n a party's motion filed
no later than 10 days after entry of judgment, the court may amend its
findings-or make additional findings-and may amend the judgment
accordingly." It does not say whether filing the motion is mandatory
for purposes of preserving an issue. As explored in Part III.A, perhaps
the maxim that differences in language are presumed to be intention-
al'o can be applied to argue that filing a motion is mandatory for pre-
serving issues. Alternatively, the absence of mandatory language could
mean that the rule does not require anything of parties. Indeed, writ-
ing nearly twenty years ago, the chief judge of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit bemoaned what he perceived as the permissive
nature of the rule: "In so many instances ... the district court could,
with relative ease, have supplied missing findings in response to a
[Rule 52(b) motion].... Currently, there is no requirement that either
party give the district court that opportunity."5'
Whether that assumption is correct has become the subject of a
circuit split. The split challenges the conclusion reached in one treatise
that federal courts "have not gone out of their way to extend [the]
application" of Rule 52.52
II. THE RULE 52(B) CIRCUIT SPLI. MUST PARTIES FILE
A 52(B) MOTION TO PRESERVE AN ISSUE?
The Eighth and Federal Circuits have held that, at least in some cir-
cumstances, failure to file a Rule 52(b) motion can prevent a party from
obtaining review of that issue on appeal. 3 These "Rule 52(b) Waiver
Courts" focus on the duties of parties in preserving issues for appeal, al-
though the courts do not describe when this interpretation of Rule 52(b)
would alter a trial court judge's burden under Rule 52(a). The First
and Second Circuits have refused to make Rule 52(b) into a some-
48 See, for example, PacifiCorp, 479 F3d at 1204. Trial courts, however, need not make detailed
findings on every issue that is in the case.
49 FRCP 52(b).
50 See Sosa vAlvarez-Machain, 542 US 692,712 n 9 (2004).
51 Howard T. Markey, Real-world Rules: Easing the Life of Litigation, 62 St John's L Rev 421,
424-25 (1988).
52 See Wright and Miller, 9A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2581 at 350 (cited in note 38).
53 See Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v Northlake Marketing and Supply, Inc, 45 F3d 1550,
1555-56 (Fed Cir 1995) (suggesting that a party may not complain about incomplete findings on
appeal, at least when such findings were not "essential to resolution of the issue"); Miller v Bitt-
ner, 985 F2d 935, 940 (8th Cir 1993); Herschler v Foodscience Corp, 1995 WL 490283, *1 (Fed Cir).
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times-mandatory motion, instead centering their analyses on the always-
mandatory requirements imposed on trial court judges by Rule 52(a).54
On the whole, the opinions speak past one another and offer very lit-
tle interpretation of the meaning of Rule 52(b).
A. One Interpretation: A Party Waives an Issue When It Fails to File
a Rule 52(b) Motion
1. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit: A Sanctions Story.
In Miller v Bittner,"5 the defendant sought sanctions against the
plaintiff under FRCP 11(c) for filing a claim that the plaintiff at least
should have known was frivolous.6 The trial court denied the sanctions
and the defendant appealed to the Eighth Circuit. The defendant ar-
gued on appeal that the trial court failed to rule on one of the issues he
had raised in his sanctions motion." The plaintiff's lawyers, however,
noted that the defendant had not filed a Rule 52(b) motion with the
trial court. That fact proved dispositive:
We need not consider whether it was error to fail to address the
[issue] because we hold that the [defendant], by failing to raise
this proposition in the trial court, deprived the trial judge of an
opportunity to address the alleged error and make further find-
ings. Therefore, the alleged error may not be raised on appeal. 8
The court's reasoning was not very clear, however. The court
quoted a large portion of Wright and Miller's treatise on the Federal
Rules. But that excerpt merely described Rule 46, which puts burdens
on parties to make contemporaneous objections, and Rule 52(a), which
places burdens on judges." Tne quoted text did not explain when judges
have an independent duty to make factual findings and reach legal con-
clusions; neither did the court.
54 See Natural Organics v Nutraceutical Corp, 426 F3d 576 (2d Cir 2005); Supermercados
Econo, Inc v Integrand Assurance Co, 375 F3d 1 (1st Cir 2004).
55 985 F2d 935 (8th Cir 1993).
56 Id at 937-38. The facts are not entirely clear, but it appears that the reason the argument
would have been frivolous relates to the fact that Bittner had successfully litigated the previous case.
57 Id at 940.
58 Id.
59 See Miller, 985 F2d at 940. That part of the treatise, quoted in the opinion, only noted
that Rule 46 is the background rule, applicable whenever Rule 52 is not. Rule 46, of course, deals
with objections to actions that the trial court takes, rather than its omissions. See note 39. Were
this not the case, it would swallow up Rule 52(a) in its entirety.
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Nearly all of the court's remaining analysis was relegated to a
string cite in a footnote, listing eleven cases that "support[ed] the fore-
going analysis."6' Of the eleven cases, only a few even tacitly supported
the court's conclusion.6 Others dealt with factual settings that were
quite different from those presented in Miller. For example, one cited
case was off point; it dealt with an issue that was waived on appeal be-
cause it was "[not made] in the complaint, no findings of fact were sought
by the plaintiff, and no objection [was] raised below to the court's failure
to make the relevant inquiry."63 That court did not cite Rule 52(b) at all. 4
Moreover, the facts of Miller provided a signal difference: the defendantS 65
had presented the issue to the trial court in a motion.
2. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Rule 52(b) and
legal tests.
The Federal Circuit has suggested that, at a minimum, an appellate
court will be more likely to hold that an issue is waived if a party fails to
file a Rule 52(b) motion. In Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v Northlake
Marketing and Supply, Inc," the district court judge mentioned the right
legal test to decide the case." Citing Rule 52(b), the court stated that
"[w]hen a party remains silent after full trial and decision and then com-
60 See id at 940 n 1.
61 See, for example, Porterco, Inc v Igloo Products Corp, 955 F2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir 1992)
(refusing to consider a trial judge's failure to make a legal determination as required under Texas
law, where the legal question was instead submitted to a jury and the appellant failed to raise an
objection under FRCP 46).
62 See, for example, Jones v Collier, 762 F2d 71,72 (8th Cir 1985) (citing Rule 46 and hold-
ing that an appellant waived his right to object to admission of evidence where he waived the
objection by testifying about the very information he hoped to keep out of the trial); Brookha-
ven Landscape v J.F Barton Contracting, 676 F2d 516, 523 (11th Cir 1982) (citing Rule 46 in a
case dealing with failure to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence).
63 George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc v Paddock Pool Builders Inc, 508 F2d 547,558 n 17 (5th Cir 1956).
64 Rather, the opinion was a common law waiver decision of the type discussed in Part I.C.
65 See 985 F2d at 937. The court similarly misread other cases. The strongest language on
Rule 52(b) appearing in any of the cited cases comes from Evans v Suntreat Growers & Shippers,
Inc, 531 F2d 568 (Temp Emer Ct App 1976). Responding to the appellant's complaint regarding
one of the district court's findings, the court in that case agreed with the statement that "if a
party is not willing to give a trial judge the benefit of suggested findings and conclusions, he is
not in the best of positions to complain that the findings made and conclusions stated are incom-
plete." Id at 570. The problem with citing Suntreat Growers is that the appellant in that case was
complaining about the specificity of one of the findings made, not the failure to make a finding
altogether. So the appellant was still able to attack the lower court's finding, but the appropriate
standard was the familiar "clearly erroneous" standard that is typically applied to appellate
review of findings of fact. See id.
66 45 F3d 1550 (Fed Cir 1995).
67 See id at 1556.
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plains about incomplete findings, the appellate tribunal should ascertain
whether any absent findings not only were essential to the resolution of
the issue, but were not made by the trial judge."' Nonetheless, the court
failed to make findings on each of the factors that makes up the test.
The court did not attempt to square its interpretation of Rule 52(b)
with the text of Rule 52(a), which puts the burden on judges to state
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Nor did it note that the relevant
legal test required findings by the trial court judge on each of the factors."0
B. Another Interpretation: A Party Does Not Waive Issues by
Failing to File a Rule 52(b) Motion
Two other circuits considering the meaning of Rule 52(b) reject the
argument that a Rule 52(b) motion is mandatory. Unlike the courts on
the other side of the split, these courts emphasize the role of Rule 52(a),
which requires judges to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: Rule 52(b) and
contested issues.
In Supermercados Econo, Inc v Integrand Assurance Co," the dis-
trict court failed to make findings on one of the plaintiff's theories of
recovery.12 The theory had been mentioned in a pretrial order of con-
tested issues, had been brought up several times at trial, and had been
the subject of testimony elicited in the trial.3
Whereas the Eighth and Federal Circuits do not mention Rule 52(a)
in their respective analyses, the Econo court began its analysis with a
description of the mandates of Rule 52(a). The court noted that the rule
is designed to promote care by the trial court and create a record suffi-
cient for appellate review." Given that the plaintiff had done enough with
68 Idat 1555.
69 In another opinion decided the same year, the Federal Circuit suggested that a party
who filed a Rule 52(b) motion waived any issues not in the Rule 52(b) motion. See Herschler,
1995 WL 490283 at *1. The court refused to consider two arguments that had not been considered
by the district court, although raised below, because the defendant had filed a Rule 52(b) motion on
a different issue. See id at *1. In a dissent, Judge Helen Nies argued that the case should be re-
manded and that she could "find no legal basis for holding that [the defendant] waived" the issues
not raised in the Rule 52(b) motion. See id.
70 See Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 17 (1966); Panduit Corp v Dennison Manufac-
turing Co, 810 F2d 1561, 1598 (Fed Cir 1987).
71 375 F3d 1 (1st Cir 2004).
72 Id at 2-3.
73 Id at 4.
74 Id at 3, citing TEC Engineering Corp v Budget Molders Supply Inc, 82 F3d 542,545 (1st
Cir 1996).
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his theory of recovery to make it a "contested matter,"" remand was ap-
propriate because "the absence of any subsidiary findings of fact or con-
clusions of law renders it virtually impossible for [the appellate court] to
do anything but speculate as to the basis of the district court's ruling.""
The defense argued that the failure to file a Rule 52(b) motion ef-
fected a waiver of the issue. Acknowledging that "counsel might have
avoided the unnecessary expense and delay" by filing such a motion, the
court nonetheless concluded that "failure to file [a Rule 52(b)] motion in
the district court does not preclude appeal."" In reaching its conclusion,
the court did not explore the relationship between Rules 52(a) and 52(b).
2. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: Rule 52(b) and
legal tests.
In the Second Circuit, a district court judge is required to consid-
er eight factors in claims for trade dress infringement. In Natural Or-
ganics, Inc v Nutraceutical Corp,8 the district court judge failed to con-
sider each factor in ruling against the plaintiff.7" The Second Circuit
reasoned that the failure of the district court to consider each of the
relevant legal factors necessitated a remand: "[I]t is incumbent upon
the district court judge to engage in a deliberate review of each factor,
and, if a factor is inapplicable to a case, to explain why."'" The court, in
a footnote, rejected the argument that parties should be required to file
a Rule 52(b) motion before Rule 52(a) is given full effect. Although one
of the judges on the panel would have endorsed such a rule because it
would ease burdens on district courts that would face remands (and
be required to make factual findings on stale memories), the other
two judges on the panel did not support this rule because they feared
district court judges would be burdened with a deluge of Rule 52(b)
motions.81 The reasoning offered by the panel was primarily prudential,
however; the court did not discuss the best interpretation of the Rule
based on prior case law or on customary tools of statutory interpretation.
75 Supermarcados, 375 F3d at 4.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 426 F3d 576 (2d Cir 2005).
79 Id at 578.
80 Id at 579.
81 See id at 579 n 1.
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III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND APPEALING
UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Rule 52(b) should not be read to impose an issue-preserving duty
on litigants beyond that required by the common law rules that courts
have applied. Traditional methods of statutory interpretation discredit
the argument that a motion under Rule 52(b) is a mandatory motion.
Moreover, the concerns about efficiency that undergird a defense of the
Rule 52(b) Waiver Courts' arguments are largely speculative and thus
fail to provide a cogent basis for questioning the conclusion reached
using the traditional methods. In fact, there are reasons to believe that the
Rule 52(b) Waiver Courts have made the law in their respective circuits
less clear, driving up costs for both litigants and judges.
A. Traditional Tools of Statutory Interpretation Suggest That
Rule 52(b) Does Not Impose a Duty
As noted in the Introduction, the question of how to allocate
burdens in a system of issue preservation is distinct from the question
of whether Rule 52(b) is a source of authority for allocating those
burdens. One of the more vexatious aspects of the holdings in the
Rule 52(b) Waiver Courts' opinions is the sparse support for the idea
that Rule 52(b) imposes duties on litigants. Likewise, courts that reject
this "mandatory" reading of Rule 52(b) have not adequately articulated
why that reading should be rejected.
Traditional tools of statutory interpretation suggest that Rule 52(b)
should not bear a mandatory construction. These tools provide a legiti-
mate method for determining a rule's meaning: courts often and in-
creasingly interpret federal rules of procedure in ihIt of their plain
meaning,8 or by resort to other customary methods of statutory inter-
pretation, including structure and legislative history.83
There is a consensus starting point for applying those tools. It is
axiomatic that courts should start with the text in an effort to divine
its meaning: "[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
82 See, for example, Business Guides, Inc v Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc, 498
US 533, 540 (1989); Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322-23 (1986); Delta Airlines, Inc v Au-
gust, 450 US 346, 356-57 (1981). See also Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Con-
text of Federal Jurisdiction, 76 Geo Wash L Rev 52, 88 n 197 (2007).
83 See, for example, Yousuf v Samantar, 451 F3d 248,255 (DC Cir 2006) (interpreting a rule
of civil procedure based on the structure of the rules as a whole); United States v Hochevar, 214 F3d
342, 343 (2d Cir 2000) (per curiam) (discussing previous versions of a federal rule of appellate
procedure, as well as the Advisory Committee Notes, in support of the court's interpretation).
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what it means and means in a statute what it says there."" When the
text is unclear, courts commonly use canons of construction, look to
the structure of the statutory scheme, and examine the legislative histo-
ry of a provision." This Part follows each step and concludes that none
supports a mandatory reading of Rule 52(b): the plain language of the
provision is indeterminate, and the structure and history of the Rule
suggest that Rule 52(b) should not be read to impose a duty on litigants.
1. The language of Rule 52(b) in isolation.
The plain language of Rule 52(b) does not reveal whether the pro-
vision imposes a duty on litigants. The rule states that a court may
amend its findings or make additional findings "[o]n a party's motion.""
What the court does is permissive-may--and what the party must do
is simply unstated. Looking at the provision in isolation, it is hardly
helpful to apply the maxim that differences in language are presumed
to be intentional. The argument would be that, because what judges do
under the rule is permissive ("may"), the omission of similar permissive
language (describing what parties do under the rule) makes filing a
Rule 52(b) motion mandatory.
84 Connecticut National Bank v Germain, 503 US 249, 253-54 (1992). For a particularly
vivid expression of the idea, see Sturges v Crowninshield, 17 US (4 Wheat) 122, 203 (1819) (ex-
plaining that in order to ignore the plain meaning of a provision, the case "must be one in which
the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all
mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application"). See also Felix Frankfur-
ter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum L Rev 527, 535 (1947) ("Though we
may not end with the words in construing a disputed statute, one certainly begins there."). For
one of many articles that note pitfalls, legal fictions, and general shortcomings of statutory inter-
pretation, see generally, Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv L Rev 863 (1930).
To be sure, there may be great disagreement about when the meaning is not plain and about
the tools of statutory interpretation that ought be brought to bear on a given question. See gen-
erally Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va L Rev 347 (2005). But there is widespread
agreement that determining intent is generally the goal of the interpreter and that text is the
starting point. See id at 347-48 (noting that even "judges whom we think of as textualists con-
struct their sense of objective meaning from what the evidence that they are willing to consider
tells them about the subjective intent of the enacting legislature").
85 See, for a recent example, Tellabs, Inc v Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, 127 S Ct 2499, 2509
(2007) (citing Congress's "inten[tion] to strengthen existing pleading requirements" as evidenced
by the report of a House-Senate conference committee). New Textualism, an interpretive ap-
proach that finds an exponent in Justice Antonin Scalia, questions reliance on legislative history
on pragmatic and constitutional grounds. See William N. Eskridge, Philip P. Frickey, and Eliza-
beth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation 235-36 (Foundation 2d ed 2006). Justice
Scalia's views have many supporters but have not been adopted by a majority of the Court.
86 FRCP 52(b).
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Attempting to make the argument provides a fine illustration of
the maxim's logical limits.[ Conceptually the limitation is similar to one
of the limitations of the inclusio unius canon."' Consider a mother who
tells her son that he may not choke his sister; it is not sensible to infer that
he can punch his sister instead." Drawing a reasonable inference would
require a background rule against which the parent's commands were
opel ating. For example, if a parent tells a child that she can have "one
cookie and one brownie," there is a strong argument that the child is
not allowed to have a candy bar, "because the instruction reflects a
background rule of 'no sweets unless authorized."O
Relating these examples to Rule 52(b), it is unreasonable to draw
the inference that Rule 52(b) is either mandatory or permissive be-
cause there is no identifiable background rule-some rules contain
mandatory language and others contain permissive language." All one
can divine from the language of Rule 52(b) in isolation is that once a
party files a motion under Rule 52(b), a judge may, but need not,
make additional findings and amend the judgment accordingly.
2. A holistic approach to Rule 52(b).
Another canon of construction, the "whole act rule," looks at the
meaning of words and provisions within the structure of their statute.
It is deployed against the background assumption that lawmaking
does not occur within a textual vacuum; courts should "not look mere-
ly to a particular clause" but examine the entire statute to effectuate
the will of the drafters.! The reason is simple: "A provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
87 See, for example, United States v Vonn, 535 US 55,66 (2002).
88 The canon inclusio unius est exclusion alterius means "[t]he inclusion of one thing suggests
the exclusion of all others." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U Chi L Rev 671,674 (1999). See United States v Vonn, 535 US 55,66 (2002).
89 See Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation at 263-64
(cited in note 85) (providing similar examples of reasonable and unreasonable inferences in
invoking the inclusio unius canon).
90 Id.
91 In some instances, a court still must ascertain for itself that it has subject matter jurisdic-
tion, even where a party's actions are permissive, such as the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See FRCP 12(b)(1). See also Capron v Van Noorden, 6 US (2
Cranch) 126, 127 (1804) ("Here it was the duty of the Court to see that they had jurisdiction, for
the consent of the parties could not give it.").
92 See, for example, West Virginia University Hospitals Inc v Casey, 499 US 83,99-102 (1991)
(describing the scope of an attorneys' fees provision in 42 USC § 1988 by reference to other parts of
the US Code).
93 Kokoszka v Belford, 417 US 642,650 (1974).
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statutory scheme -because the same terminology is used elsewhere in
a context that makes its meaning clear.""
To determine whether Rule 52(b) is a mandatory motion, the whole
act canon of construction requires consideration of related rules on issue
preservation. Three rules are relevant to the analysis; each reveals that
the drafters of the Federal Rules knew how to make language manda-
tory when they wanted to do so.
The first rule that an interpreter might look to is Rule 46. The Rule
is deployed in making contemporaneous objections to actions taken (or
untaken) by the trial judge. Rule 46 states how a party should alert a
court to perceived errors: "When the ruling or order is requested or
made, a party need only state the action that it wants the court to take
or objects to, along with the grounds for the request or objection." 95 The
final sentence implies a duty by negative implication: "Failing to object
does not prejudice a party who had no opportunity to do so when the
ruling or order was made."' The implication is that a party will be pre-
judiced by its failure to raise an objection if there is an opportunity.9
An interpreter examining the structure of the federal rules would
also look to Rule 51. The rule deals with charging instructions in jury
trials, and its language makes plain what a party must do in order to
challenge the validity of the instructions on appeal: "A party who ob-
jects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction must do so
on the record, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the
grounds for the objection. '" Like Rule 46, the rule provides unambi-
guous guidance to litigants.
Finally, resort to structure shows that Rule 52(a) is similarly clear
in laying out the mandatory duties of judges: they "must find the facts
specially and state [their] conclusions of law separately."" The use of
94 United Savings Association of Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd, 484 US
365, 371 (1988) ("Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor.").
95 FRCP 46. For a discussion of Rule 46, see note 39.
96 FRCP 46.
97 Of course, this is another version of the inclusio unius canon, but the inference here is more
neatly drawn. This inference requires knowledge of the earlier version of the Rule, which refe-
renced the common law rules on objections. Prior to the 2007 Amendment, the informal objec-
tions referred to in the rule were contrasted with the "purposes for which an exception has here-
tofore been necessary." FRCP 46 (2006). The contrast makes clear that the Rule is incorporating a
common law background rule-in which bills of exceptions were necessary to preserve an issue-as
discussed in Part I.B. Rudimentary logic also shows why. Let 0 = Opportunity to object;
P = Prejudice; -' = Not. The construction of the relevant language in Rule 46 can be represented as:
-'0 -- -P. The contrapositive of this construction is: P --> 0. So if a party has been prejudiced
under Rule 46, then the party had an opportunity to object.
98 FRCP 51(c)(1) (emphasis added).
99 FRCP 52(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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the word "must" indicates that the duty imposed on the judge is man-
datory; these are not merely words of entreaty.'00 The provision does
not require the parties to do anything, stating that a party "may later
question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings,
whether or not the party requested findings, objected to them, moved
to amend them, or moved for partial findings.'..1
In short, an examination of the Federal Rules reveals that its draf-
ters knew how to make actions mandatory when they wanted to do so.
Therefore, in the context of a holistic approach, it seems appropriate to
apply the canon that when drafters use different words in different
places, those differences are presumed to be intentional.' 2 Rules 51
and 52(a) contain mandatory language, and Rule 46 leaves no doubt
about when and how a party must make an objection. In contrast,
Rule 52(b) neither contains mandatory language nor leads to neces-
sary inferences.
[W]hen it is clear that Congress knew how to specify [mandatory
language] when it wanted to, [a contrary reading] runs afoul of
the usual rule that when the legislature uses certain language in
one part of the statute and different language in another, the
court assumes different meanings were intended.' 3
The structural point merits further discussion, particularly inas-
much as holistic interpretation can ensure that an interpretation of one
provision does not do violence to another provision. Indeed, the Court
has stated that, in interpreting federal rules of procedure, courts should
pay particular attention to the structure of the rules, not merely the
different language in various provisions. The structure of the Federal
Rules supports a nonmandatory interpretation of Rule 52(b). A read-
ing of Rule 52(b) that imposed a duty on parties to point out errors or
risk waiving those issues on appeal would neuter the "shall" language
in paragraph (a) pertaining to duties of trial judges. If a party's failure
to object to the lack of findings rendered the issue unreviewable, then
the judge would not have to find the facts and the law in all cases, but
only those in which parties pointed out the error to the trial court
judge. Put another way, requiring parties to file Rule 52(b) motions, in
100 See, for example, Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678, 697-97 (2001) (contrasting "may"
with "must").
101 FRCP 52(a)(5).
102 See Sosa vAlvarez-Machain, 542 US 692,712 n 9 (2004).
103 Id.
104 See Tome v United States, 513 US 150, 160-61 (1995) (plurality opinion) (discussing the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
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order to preserve an issue that the judge was required to rule on,
would at least partially swallow up Rule 52(a).
In contrast, a nonmandatory interpretation of Rule 52(b) gives full
effect to Rule 52(a); at the same time it preserves an important role for
Rule 52(b). This Comment began with a hypothetical about three issues
on which a trial judge was arguably required to make findings. However,
because trial judges are required to make factual findings and legal
conclusions only on issues that were raised by parties, Rule 52(b) can
function as a safety valve -a way to avoid waiving an issue on appeal.
That is to say, the nonmandatory interpretation of Rule 52(b) still al-
lows Rule 52(a) to operate with full force while also allowing parties to
ensure that they have preserved an issue (such that a trial court's failure
to make a finding could necessitate a remand under Rule 52(a)). Read-
ing the two provisions in pari materia in this way, rather than in inevita-
ble conflict, allows both rules to be given full effect.
More generally, a holistic approach to interpreting the Federal
Rules may tell us more about the "intent of the drafters" than is the
case when the approach is applied to statutes. One criticism of the
whole act rule is that it assumes "a single-minded and omniscient leg-
islature which is strongly at odds with actual legislative practice, where
terms are inserted willy-nilly into the law. 1.5 In contrast, the Federal
Rules are not drafted by 535 representatives, their staffs, executive
agencies, or other actors who influence the legislative process. '16 The
process for drafting the Federal Rules arguably allows for higher qual-
ity deliberation and evinces a concern for the structure of the Rules,'
a fact that can be observed in the Advisory Committee Notes."8
3. Advisory Committee silence.
There is not a single note by the Advisory Committee about
Rule 52(b), which stands in contrast to the extensive discussion of
Rule 52(a). If Rule 52(b) imposed a duty on parties to raise an issue or
risk waiving it, that interpretation likely would have been mentioned in
105 Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation at 271 (cited in
note 85).
106 See Antonin Scalia, Common-law Courts in a Civil-law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in Amy Gutmann, ed, A Matter of
Interpretation 3,32 (Princeton 1997).
107 See Lori A. Johnson, Creating Rules for Federal Courts: Administrative Prerogative of
Legislative Policymaking, 24 Just Sys J 23 (2003).
108 See Tome, 513 US at 160-61. See also Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in Gutman, ed, A
Matter of Interpretation 95, 99-100 (cited in note 106) (noting that "comprehensive, coherent, and
self-contained texts" more readily lend themselves to interpretation based on structure).
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the Advisory Committee Notes, particularly given that the language of
the Rule is not explicit and the common law history on issue preserva-
tion is well established. The Court has lent credence to similar reason-
ing in rejecting interpretations of rules of practice that would have
silently altered the common law: "Where the [Federal Rules of Evi-
dence] did depart from their common-law antecedents, in general the
Committee said so."" More basically, the silence in the legislative his-
tory is analogous to the "barking dog" canon of statutory construc-
tion, .° which takes its name from the Sherlock Holmes mystery Silver
Blaze,"' and which advises courts to consider drafting history, or lack
thereof, to evaluate whether "new statutory language was [] meant
to have a broader effect on established statutory policies.',
12
Justice Antonin Scalia, among others, has been sharply critical of
the canon: "Statutes are the law though sleeping dogs lie.""' Even
though he has been critical of reading into legislative silence, he has
emphasized an idea that amounts to an interpretive bedfellow. In
Whitman v American Trucking Associations, Inc,"' Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for a majority, rejected the EPA's arguments about what factors
the EPA was permitted to consider in making certain rules under the
Clean Air Act. "Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamen-
tal details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provi-
sions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes. ' "5
The conclusion that Rule 52(b) was not intended to alter substan-
tially the duties imposed on judges under Rule 52(a) is supported on
similar grounds. The language of Rule 52(b) is vague and the manda-
tory reading of the Rule would substantially alter common law prac-
tice. Moreover, the rationale for resorting to the silence in the Advi-
sory Committee Notes is stronger than in the context of enacted sta-
109 See Tome, 513 US at 160-61.
110 See Chisom v Roemer, 501 US 380, 396 (1991) (rejecting one construction of a statute
"because we are convinced that if Congress had such an intent, Congress would have made it
explicit in the statute, or at least some of the Members would have identified or mentioned it at
some point in the unusually extensive legislative history"). See also Allapattah Services, Inc v
Exxon Corp, 362 F3d 739, 756 (11th Cir 2004) ("Under the Barking Dog Canon, general lan-
guage in a statute should not be interpreted as applying to a specific, particularly controversial
situation if there is no recognition whatsoever in the statute's text or legislative history that it
would have had such an effect.").
111 See generally Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Adventures of Sherlock
Holmes and the Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes 277 (Penguin 2001).
112 Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation at 314 (cited in
note 85).
113 See Chisom, 501 US at 406 (Scalia dissenting).
114 531 US 457 (2001).
115 id at 468.
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tutes: the advisory committees for various rules of procedure work to
ensure that the Rules are internally consistent and clear.6 Moreover,
the language of Rule 46 makes plain both the extent to which the
Rule is operating against the common law backdrop and the extent to
which the Rule is inconsistent with its common law antecedents. "'
Given these characteristics of the Advisory Committee, as well as the
history and body of law related to issue preservation, it seems all the
more unlikely that the drafters of the Federal Rules would have used
the mousy (and indeterminate) Rule 52(b) to substantially alter an
extensive body of common law on issue preservation.
B. There Is No Basis for Abandoning Traditional Interpretive
Techniques Based on Efficiency Concerns
Part III.A strongly counsels against reading Rule 52(b) as a some-
times-mandatory motion. There is a logical concern, however, that read-
ing Rule 52(b) as a permissive rule could impose unnecessary costs on
trial courts, appellate courts, and parties. Courts that have offered an
interpretation of Rule 52(b) have stated or implied that efficiency con-
cerns informed their interpretations of the Rule. ' Moreover, as an ap-
proach, defending a mandatory reading of Rule 52(b) on efficiency
grounds is not without merit, as the Supreme Court has stated that
"[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,' '".9 and
Rule 52(b)'s meaning is not plain. ' 2° Nonetheless, the efficiency gains '
116 See, for example, FRCP 44.1, Advisory Committee Notes on Adoption (describing the
interaction of the rule with Rule 8(a) and providing a sentence-by-sentence analysis of the Rule).
117 See notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Notably, unlike Rule 52(b), courts in myriad
opinions have recognized that Rule 46 codified common law practices. See, for example, Neu v
Grant, 548 F2d 281, 286-87 (10th Cir 1977); Johnston v Reily, 160 F2d 249, 250 (DC Cir 1947),
citing Noonan v Caledonia Gold Mining Co, 121 US 393 (1887).
118 See Miller, 985 F2d at 941; Natural Organics, 426 F3d at 579 n 1.
119 See Bankers Trust Co v Mallis, 435 US 381, 386-87 (1978), quoting FRCP 1. See also
Nelson v Adams USA, Inc, 529 US 460, 465 (2000) (linking the concept of efficiency with due
process and citing FRCP 1 for the proposition that elements of due process are embodied in the
federal rules); Torres v Oakland Scavenger Co, 487 US 312,319 (1988) (Scalia concurring).
Of course, construing the Rules so as to secure efficient outcomes should not be an unlimited
license for courts to rewrite the Rules, and the Supreme Court has cautioned that the interpretive
endeavor should not be transformed into an effort to amend the Rules by judicial fiat: "[O]ur task is
not to decide what the rule should be, but rather to determine what it is." Business Guides, 498 US
at 548-49.
120 See notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
121 The directive in Rule 1 to secure outcomes that are speedy and inexpensive speaks to
efficiency concerns. The command to interpret the rules so as to bring about justice, however,
does not necessarily speak to efficiency concerns, at least absent a normative vision that imports
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that the Rule 52(b) Waiver Courts foresee are speculative, and indeed
there are sound reasons to think that they would fail to materialize. This
is not to say that the Rule 52(b) Waiver Courts are wrong; it is to say that
there is no compelling reason to think that they are right. Given this "sta-
lemate of empirical intuitions," there is no reason to abandon the analysis
in Part III.A.
To be sure, there is an argument that interpreting Rule 52(b) as a
sometimes-mandatory motion would increase efficiency.", Under this
interpretation, parties could avoid costly relitigation of issues that were
argued (but not passed upon) in the lower court. Likewise, lower courts
would presumably be in a better position to consider matters in a
Rule 52(b) motion immediately after the trial than on remand months
or years later. Moreover, a sometimes-mandatory reading could har-
ness the comparative advantages held by various legal actors. Parties
are probably in the best position to know what arguments they have
made12' and nearly always will be in the best position to know which
issues are most important to them. At the same time, judges are in the
best position to make required legal findings. Law is their core compe-
tency, rather than the facts of any given case.' Moreover, in other con-
texts, courts have proven capable of crafting judicial rules based on
notions of efficiency into a conception of justice. This is plausible, but to the extent that Rule 1
captures ideas about justice that are broader than efficiency concerns, and, so long as those
broader notions of justice are in conflict with (or temper) efficiency-based arguments, then this
undermines the extent to which courts should rely on efficiency rationales. In any event, because
the extent to which the interpretation of the Rule 52(b) Waiver Courts increases efficiency is far
from clear, this Comment need not explore the deeply contentious questions of the extent to
which efficiency concerns should give way to concerns about justice.
122 The ability to make informed estimates as to the probabilities of legal outcomes allows
parties to choose their battles, at trial and on appeal. See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law 463 (Harvard 2006) (noting that besides error correction, the appeals
process harmonizes the law and amplifies the law through new interpretations, although other
systems could serve these functions).
123 See Natural Organics, 426 F3d at 579 n 1. See also Administrative Office of the US Courts,
Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2007 Annual Report of the Director ("Judicial Business")
107, table B-4 (2007), online at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf
(visited Aug 29,2008) (reporting the passage of twenty-eight months from district court decision
to final disposition in the court of appeals).
124 Consider United States v Gomez, 446 US 635,639-40 (1980) (reasoning that a plaintiff in
a § 1983 action was not required to state in his pleadings that the public official had acted in bad
faith in part because the information was "peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the
defendant"). This idea, as applied to Rule 52(b), rests on the commonsense notion that a party
who makes a filing with a court will be most familiar with its content.
125 This reading might lead one to favor the outcome in Miller, dealing with an argument
made in a motion, but question the outcome in Glaverbel, dealing with a required legal finding.
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the comparative advantages of legal actors, even if the determinations
were more easily made. 1
6
These arguments founder-at least for purposes of interpreting
the federal rules-not because they are wrong, but because they rest
on unverifiable empirical assumptions and may be difficult to imple-
ment as a practical matter.
First, consider the open empirical questions about how actors would
actually respond to a sometimes-mandatory reading of Rule 52(b). There
are sound reasons to think that such a reading would unnecessarily drive
up costs for litigants while leading judges to underinvest their resources.
Inasmuch as divvying up the duties proves difficult, making Rule 52(b)
sometimes mandatory may increase a party's costs at the trial stage be-
cause parties will face new incentives to file a Rule 52(b) motion or risk
waiving the issue for purposes of appeal. That is, parties might react to a
sometimes-mandatory reading of Rule 52(b) by combing the trial
record in search of an argument made to the judge but unaddressed in
the court's decision. In contrast, trial court judges might underinvest,
failing to address issues that the parties litigated. And although parties
might invoke Rule 52(b) as a backstop, they may lack the resources to
search the trial record for aspects of the case that the trial court judge
should have addressed,'27 which means a sometimes-mandatory rule
could, on balance, deliver less bang for taxpayers' dollars-and trial
judges would enjoy little incentive to evince care and thoroughness.121
A second concern is that, as a practical matter, it would be diffi-
cult to decide when to make Rule 52(b) into a sometimes-mandatory
motion. The language of Rule 52 or adjacent rules offers no guidance
on when to place the burden on the complaining party or on the judge.
Moreover, it may not always be clear whether parties or judges sit in
the best position to bear a given burden, and the analysis could be
subject to a variety of variables, such as the size of the factual record,
the complexity of the legal issue, the sophistication of the parties, or
126 See Gomez, 446 US at 639-40; United States v Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Co, 191
US 84,91-92 (1903). See also note 129.
127 Compare Administrative Office of the US Courts, Judicial Business at 163-68, table C-3B
(cited in note 123) (reporting roughly 240,000 civil cases decided in the district courts in 2007), with
id at 90-94 B-1A (reporting roughly 30,000 civil cases appealed in 2007).
128 Again, the point is that the answers to the empirical questions are speculative. It may be
that judges expend too many resources and that a Pareto superior move (for judges and liti-
gants) would reduce the thoroughness with which judges consider cases in exchange for speedy
resolution. The answer is not obvious.
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even the particular competencies of the court or trial court judge.",
For example, it is not obvious whether a trial judge in a given district
will be in a better informational position with respect to patent law
than certain parties who frequently litigate patent claims before the
Federal Circuit. Inasmuch as the lines will be difficult to draw, both
litigants and judges might face incentives to overspend."
In any event, the broader point remains: the possibility that the
Rule 52(b) Waiver Courts might increase the efficient administration
of justice rests largely on speculation, and it seems just as likely that
their reading would lead to inefficient use of resources by both litigants
and judges. Indeed, the early indications suggest the Rule 52(b) Waiver
Courts have made the law less clear within their circuits, providing in-
centives for legal actors to expend resources in a wasteful manner.
CONCLUSION
This Comment fills a void in the discussion over the meaning of
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules, lately the subject of a circuit split. Those
courts that have considered whether Rule 52(b) imposes a duty on liti-
gants, on both sides of the circuit split, have failed to deploy persuasive
arguments about the meaning of the Rule. Employing traditional tools of
statutory interpretation in interpreting the federal rules, an increasingly
common practice by the Court, reveals that Rule 52(b) should not be
interpreted as a sometimes-mandatory motion.
The Rule 52(b) Waiver Courts aggressively -and erroneously, as
this Comment argues -interpreted a rule of civil procedure that proba-
bly was not intended to supplant hundreds of years of appellate prac-
129 In contrast, focusing on the comparative advantage of the parties in the context of
pleading burdens may be a more easily administered approach. First, pleading burdens deal only
with one of two parties. See notes 124-26 and accompanying text. In contrast, Rule 52(b) adds a
third actor-the judge. Second, pleading burdens typically deal with information that is obvious-
ly in the control of one party, for example the state of mind of one of the parties. See id. In con-
trast, the text accompanying this note questions whether it will always or even often be clear
whether a judge or party stands in the best position to carry a burden precisely because it is
unclear which actors possess the best information. And a case-by-case determination will en-
courage all actors to overspend because the risks of waiving an issue can be catastrophic.
130 Indeed, judges could be encouraged to expend additional resources deciding issues that
might otherwise have been deemed forfeited. Consider, for example, Rivera-Torres v Ortiz Velez,
341 F3d 86, 102 (1st Cir 2003) (explaining that claims "forfeited through [the] error or neglect" of
one of the parties are reviewed only for plain error). Not only would this consume trial court
judges' time and energy, it would reduce the likelihood that resolution could be had in a "spee-
dy" manner. See note 119. See also FRCP 1. If this picture were correct, a sometimes-mandatory
reading would be worse than an always-mandatory reading.
131 See Proportion-Air, Inc v Buzmatics, Inc, 1995 WL 360549, *2 (Fed Cir). See also Golden
Blount, Inc v Robert H. Peterson Co, 365 F3d 1054,1060 (Fed Cir 2004).
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tice. Moreover, whether their rule or another rule would produce effi-
cient outcomes is far from clear. Indeed, the failure of the Rule 52(b)
Waiver Courts to provide any indication about whether Rule 52(a) or
Rule 52(b) will govern in a given factual setting seems to have, within
those circuits, undermined what Karl Llewellyn referred to as the "reck-
onability" of both trial and appellate practice."' Because the Rule 52(b)
Waiver Courts do not attempt to harmonize their interpretive approach
with common law practices on issue preservation, it is possible to ob-
tain, within the same circuit, one result using the Rule 52(b) analysis
and a different result based on judge-made law. When a would-be ap-
pellant cannot tell if an issue at trial was preserved for appeal, there is a
higher likelihood that the wrong choice will be made, imposing unne-
cessary costs. ' The Rule 52(b) Waiver Courts do not provide a coherent
framework to guide legal actors in making that choice.
The irony is obvious: one reason to prefer codification to judge-
made law is that an enacted rule can make the law clearer by specifying
precisely what that law requires. Yet when judges and litigants intermit-
tently rely on a statutory command that does not actually exist, they
inject into the law the very confusion whose potential the codifiers had
hoped to avoid. To return to Mark Twain,"' what is true for words in
general is also true for words in the law: the difference between the
almost right legal rule and the right legal rule is the difference be-
tween the lightning bug and the lightning.
132 See Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Traditionr Deciding Appeals 17 (Little, Brown 1960).
133 See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law at 461 (cited in note 122).
134 See note 1.
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